




In a decision from the last term, the Supreme Court held that a 
state law prohibiting the use of state funds by employers for both anti- 
and pro-union advocacy was preempted by federal law.  Chamber of 
Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).  The Brown decision sparks 
this debate between Professors Paul M. Secunda, of Marquette Univer-
sity Law School, and Jeffrey M. Hirsch, of the University of Tennessee 
College of Law, as to whether the federal government or the states are 
best equipped to protect the rights of workers under the law. 
Professor Secunda argues that federal regulation enacted to pro-
tect workers in the workplace has suffered from lack of enforcement 
and political bias.  Thus, because “the federal government . . . has 
proven unwilling and unable to protect the basic rights of workers,” 
he maintains that “state law should be permitted to play a comple-
mentary role in all of [the] areas of workplace regulation where fed-
eral law is silent or absent.”  Individual states, then, could act as “labo-
ratories” that could “engage in thoughtful, legislative 
experimentation.”   Finding the idea of an exclusive federal scheme 
likely to result in “self-selection bias and inefficient prioritization of 
agency resources,” he concludes that needed regulation may only be 
available to the states. 
Professor Hirsch counters that Professor Secunda’s proposal 
would exacerbate the problems with the current underenforcement of 
workers’ rights, which at least partly results from the complexity cre-
ated by a regulatory framework made up of federal, state, and local 
law.  As a solution, Hirsch proposes that the federal government 
should be given exclusive control of the workplace, under a single sys-
tem of enforcement and regulation.  His suggested changes include a 
single workplace law statute, a single agency to administer that statute, 
and a litigation-based enforcement approach that includes the crea-
tion of private-rights of action for violations and the creation of a spe-
cialized Article III labor and employment court.  Thus, while conced-
ing that “[t]he federal government’s regulation of the workplace has 
been far from perfect,” he argues that “it is a far better choice than 
fifty different state regimes.” 
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There is a palpable irony in turning to the states for assistance in 
protecting workers in the workplace.  Laws like the Railway Labor Act 
of 1926, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, and the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, were expressly enacted to take power 
away from management-friendly state courts.  Historically, these 
courts, at a moment’s notice and often ex parte, intervened in labor 
disputes and entered injunctions against unions and their allies based 
on the whims of the judge.  Proponents of the NLRA saw its enact-
ment as a way to overcome these anti-union state influences and to 
foster at the federal level the use of collective bargaining to promote 
the workplace rights of employees. 
Nevertheless, some seventy-five years later, it is the federal gov-
ernment that has proven unwilling and unable to protect the basic 
rights of workers through exclusive federal regimes like the NLRA, 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).  In such an environment, it 
is time to “employ” state legislatures to see if they can find the neces-
sary balm for what ills the American worker in areas where federal la-
bor law remains silent.  To borrow Justice Brandeis’s federalism con-
ception, by allowing states to operate as laboratories of 
experimentation today, workplace rights will not only flourish at the 
state level in the short term, but also gain traction at the federal level 
for years to come. 
II. 
In Taking States out of the Workplace, Professor Jeffrey Hirsch argues 
that for workers’ best interests, states should play no role in regulating 
the workplace.  117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 225 (2008), http:// 
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thepocketpart.org/2008/04/01/hirsch.html.  More specifically, he 
argues that in order to make federal workplace law enforcement more 
effective, state law should simply disappear, making regulation in this 
area less complex and, therefore, more enforceable.  Hirsch paints 
with this anti-federalist broad brush, all the while conceding the cur-
rent dire situation facing American workers. 
For me, Hirsch’s anti-federalist stance is theoretically appealing 
from a structural standpoint in that I agree that the federal govern-
ment ideally would be best equipped to manage labor relations.  But 
the idea lacks practicality because of the current inability of the feds 
to do anything of the sort.  This skepticism of a benevolent, universal 
federal regime is further fueled by the history of labor and employ-
ment law in contexts as diverse as union-management relations, occu-
pational safety and health, and employer-provided pension and wel-
fare benefits.  Courts, agencies, and employers have routinely 
operated together in order to stifle employees’ rights to organize, to 
receive promised pension and health benefits, and to work in a non-
hazardous work environment.  State regulation to fill in the gaps in 
federal labor and employment is therefore vital to ameliorate the 
harshness of these existing regimes. 
In this Debate, I argue that state law should be permitted to play a 
complementary role in all of these areas of workplace regulation 
where federal law is silent or absent.  Of course, in a short essay it is 
not possible to explore the numerous state law initiatives that would 
complement current federal labor and employment law.  Yet, a recent 
labor decision by the United States Supreme Court and a flurry of leg-
islative initiatives by states in the labor relations context helpfully il-
luminate the dangers of an exclusive federal workplace regime and 
the advantages of allowing states to provide additional protections for 
workers. 
III. 
The workplace federalism debate has gained increased promi-
nence in the labor-management world in light of the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision last term in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 
128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).  In Brown, the Court found that federal labor 
law preempted a California state law which prohibited the use of state 
funds by employers for anti- or pro-union expression.  Justice Stevens, 
for the majority, relied on the Machinists labor preemption doctrine to 
find the California law preempted.  That doctrine, based on a 1976 
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Supreme Court case, requires a court to strike down a state law that 
interferes with the free flow of economic forces between labor and 
management.  Justice Stevens concluded that the California law 
impermissibly interfered with the free flow of economic forces in the 
organizing context and thus carried no force.  Consequently, Califor-
nia employers may now use state funds to fight unionization efforts. 
The likely outcome of Brown is that many California employers 
facing organizational campaigns will utilize these additional funds to 
make anti-union presentations, called captive audience speeches.  In 
these meetings, employers force their employees during work to listen 
to their views on union, political, and religious issues. (Wal-Mart has 
recently been accused of engaging in these meetings with its employ-
ees for political purposes.)  Employees in return usually cannot speak, 
leave, or offer a rebuttal, without risking termination for insubordina-
tion.  The effectiveness of this tactic is illustrated by the fact that a re-
cent government report studying four hundred union campaigns 
found that ninety-two percent of these campaigns included captive 
audience meetings and the average union campaign had eleven such 
captive audience meetings held by employers. 
In an exclusive federal labor regime of the type Professor Hirsch 
favors, that is the end of the story for employees.  Employees will sim-
ply have to put up with captive audience speeches by their employers 
in an at-will employment world and the likelihood of union represen-
tation will continue to dim with employers using state money to tilt 
the economic forces, discussed in Brown, even further to their favor. 
IV. 
The operative legal regime need not exist in this manner.  The 
NLRA does not prohibit captive audience meetings, nor does it spe-
cifically include them within employee free speech rights under Sec-
tion 8(c).  This is because, since the National Labor Relations Board’s 
(NLRB) Livingston Shirt decision in the early 1950s, captive audience 
meetings have been found noncoercive and therefore not subject to 
unfair labor practice proceedings.  It is accurate to say that federal law 
does not regulate captive audience meetings at all. 
But what if states could come in and fill this gap in labor law, pro-
viding employees protection against captive audience meetings?  The 
answer depends on whether one thinks states should be able to enact 
minimum conditions legislation to support these rights of workers to 
organize. 
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I believe such action on a state’s part would be consistent with the 
long tradition of states using their police powers to protect the “life 
and limb” of workers by regulating the workplace.  States already do 
this to a large degree in such diverse areas as employment discrimina-
tion, child labor, wage payment and collection, and hours and wages.  
Consider that sexual orientation discrimination would not be out-
lawed but for state and local employment laws outlawing such behav-
ior.  Should we have waited for an amendment to Title VII to provide 
any protection?  How about the fact that low-income employees in cer-
tain states have earned additional income through living wage legisla-
tion?  Should those workers have had to endure endless political de-
bates about raising the federal minimum wage before receiving relief? 
The answer is:  of course not.  So why shouldn’t states also be able 
to protect workers from being harassed and intimidated by employers 
at work through captive audience meetings as a minimal working 
condition?  So what if not all employees will be able to obtain this pro-
tection at one time?  Isn’t it better to have some protection, as op-
posed to none at all, while waiting for federal laws to be enacted?  And 
let’s say that an Obama NLRB comes along and overrules Livingston 
Shirt and declares captive audience meetings coercive under Section 
8(c)?  Are we any worse off that states have provided protection from 
such practices in the meantime? 
In fact, many states have already considered such legislation over 
the last few years.  Such Worker Freedom Act (WFA) legislation would 
ensure minimum conditions for employees interested in forming a 
union by outlawing employers from holding captive audience meet-
ings during the workday. 
V. 
Now, it may be argued that even if state laws of the WFA-type are a 
good idea, they are nevertheless preempted by the current federal la-
bor law regime.  Even in light of the Brown decision, however, I believe 
WFA legislation should not be found preempted by the NLRA. 
On the one hand, Garmon preemption is inapplicable because 
such laws do not interfere with employee free choice under Section 7 
because they may voluntary still choose to listen to their employer’s 
views on unionization.  See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 
359 U.S. 236 (1959).  Nor do such laws permit what is impermissible 
for employers to do under Section 8.  Although employers are permit-
ted under Section 8(c) of the Act to freely speak in a noncoercive 
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matter about a union’s organizing campaign, that protection does not 
extend to forcing employees at the pain of termination to hear those 
same views. 
Nor should the Machinists preemption of the Brown decision apply 
in the workplace captive audience speech context.  Unlike the state 
funds issue at stake in Brown, there is little argument that the free 
speech rights of employers will be impacted by WFA laws.  Again, em-
ployers have the right to inform employees of their views on unioniza-
tion on a voluntary basis, not to hold a proverbial gun to their head 
and make them listen. 
In all, WFA state legislation would add an important layer of pro-
tection to employee organizational rights. 
VI. 
Nevertheless, under Professor Hirsch’s anti-federalist views, such 
legislation could not exist.  He and others worry that if states can pass 
laws like the WFA in labor-friendly states, then current right-to-work 
states in the South and the West will pass legislation that will make 
things even worse for workers.  There is also something to the notion 
that we as academics should not choose federal or state remedies for a 
problem just because it squares with our political agenda. 
Yet even though I believe that the federal government and the 
NLRB should regulate private-sector labor relations through the 
NLRA, there is no reason why state law cannot be an interim fix.  If an 
Obama Board later expressly prohibits such meetings under Section 
8(c), the WFA laws would be Garmon preempted.  Similarly, state laws 
in this venue would not make labor law more complex as Hirsch fears 
if a McCain Board moves specifically to permit such captive audience 
meetings, which would thereby also Garmon preempt WFA legislation.  
In other words, WFA legislation would act as a significant place holder 
while the federal government debates the proper course and signals 
to the feds that resolution of this issue is ripe. 
Furthermore, the costs of state WFA enactment are relatively low 
because it is hard to imagine how the background norms animating 
state contract law (or property law for that matter) could be made 
much more employer-friendly than they currently are (especially 
given present federal and state minimum conditions legislation that 
already exists).  Employees in the United States exist in a world where 
employers have nearly absolute property rights to exclude unions and 
others from their workplaces and the employment at-will doctrine 
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gives employers maximum flexibility when it comes to hiring and ter-
minating their employees. 
This is not to say that the labor movement should not continue to 
search for a federal fix to this problem.  Labor’s allies in Congress 
have proposed in the last year alone a number of pieces of legislation 
to try to ameliorate the current situation and, like Professor Hirsch, I 
agree that with the “right” political results at the next election such 
labor reform may be in the offing.  But again, neither a McCain Board 
or Obama Board decision, nor labor law reform of the NLRA itself, 
would be impacted by state WFA legislation in the long-term.  Such 
state legislation would be preempted once the federal law is no longer 
silent on the topic. 
So while we wait for federal labor law reform, states should be 
permitted to take up the mantle of workers’ rights and engage in 
thoughtful, legislative experimentation.  Such a move is an ironic ne-
cessity and, yes, perish the thought, consistent with notions of federal-
ism. 
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Attempts to reform our current workplace regulatory scheme 
could move in two opposite directions:  either add to today’s byzan-
tine system of workplace rules or dramatically simplify that system.  
One of the central fronts of this dispute is the states’ role in governing 
the workplace.  We could seek to expand the number of workplace 
rights by giving states more authority, but we should first ask whether 
workers would actually benefit from such a change.  This question is 
important, for the true irony of workplace law is that increasing the 
number of workplace rights—particularly through state regulation—
may make workers worse off. 
Professor Paul Secunda and I agree on many things.  Most impor-
tantly, we both believe that the law should do more for workers.  
Where we diverge is the solution.  Professor Secunda would increase 
states’ regulation of the workplace, allowing them to fill in gaps in 
federal workplace regulations.  This approach would certainly create 
more rights for workers.  But what good are those rights if workers are 
unable to take advantage of them?  Today, many workplace rights are 
frequently left unfulfilled, a problem that an increased state role 
would exacerbate.  Thus, I argue for an approach that would help 
employees actually enjoy the rights they have—an approach that 
would eliminate states’ authority to regulate the workplace. 
I. 
The differences between our two approaches are perhaps less ex-
treme than they first appear.  In addition to sharing the same goal, I 
concede that my proposal is not a perfect one.  As Professor Secunda 
accurately points out, some workers would be worse off if states no 
longer had authority to regulate the workplace.  However, the costs to 
those workers would be outweighed by the benefits to other workers 
and the workplace regulatory system as a whole.  These benefits would 
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largely result from correcting serious deficiencies in the enforcement 
of today’s workplace laws. 
Many scholars—Professor Secunda and myself included—have 
decried the failure of a vast array of workplace laws to achieve their 
promise.  For example, despite the explicit prohibition against em-
ployment discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, many 
workers must still endure discriminatory acts at the hands of their 
employers.  Similarly, the protections given to whistleblowers look 
good on paper, but amount to virtually nothing in practice.  The same 
is true for numerous other workplace laws. 
There are many causes for the deficiency of these laws, including 
the current presidential administration’s resistance to workers’ rights.  
But the problem is not one of politics alone.  President Clinton’s ad-
ministration was much friendlier to workers, but our workplace laws 
still suffered many ills during his time in office.  A more fundamental 
reason for this growing problem is that the sheer complexity of to-
day’s system of workplace laws makes compliance and enforcement of 
those laws extraordinarily difficult.  Federal, state, and local govern-
ments all have a role in workplace regulation, each with its own set of 
laws.  Moreover, these laws frequently cover the exact same type of 
conduct.  At times, these laws are consistent, but far too often they are 
not. 
So, why does this complexity matter?  Imagine an employer that is 
faced with a dizzying array of statutes, administrative rules, and cases 
that may regulate its workplace.  It requires a significant amount of re-
sources to understand which laws apply and how to comply with them.  
Things are even worse for employees.  It is not surprising, given em-
ployers’ difficulty in understanding workplace laws, that employees 
are at almost a complete loss.  This is particularly significant because 
most workplace rules require employees to initiate an action—a diffi-
cult requirement if they are not even aware of the rules or what they 
mean.  Finally, if a dispute actually manages to result in litigation, the 
diverse set of workplace rules often requires multiple claims to be ad-
judicated in multiple forums.  This duplicity is a waste of resources 
and, not surprisingly, creates judicial resistance to such claims.  The 
result is a situation in which employers frequently do not comply with 
workplace rules, employees lack the resources to enforce their rights, 
and judges throw out good cases along with bad ones.  In short, our 
workplace rules fail to accomplish their own goals. 
Cutting down on this complexity is critical to the ultimate useful-
ness of workplace rights.  Professor Secunda’s proposal to increase 
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state governance of the workplace runs directly counter to that goal.  
Although the marginal effect of a single new state rule is low, the ag-
gregate effect of numerous state-promulgated rules is great.  The sys-
tem is already bogged down by an overabundance of overlapping rules 
and forums—adding to that burden makes little sense. 
This burden leads me to argue for exclusive federal control of the 
workplace.  Admittedly, the federal government has not always been 
the best enforcer of workplace laws, but such imperfection is still bet-
ter than today’s convoluted system.  Moreover, eliminating state regu-
lation could lead to further simplification because placing all author-
ity within one form of government provides a greater opportunity to 
streamline rules. 
II. 
Professor Secunda, while conceding that federal control of an in-
creasingly global workplace makes sense, argues that states still have 
much to contribute to workers’ rights.  Evidence of these contribu-
tions are fleeting, however.  To be sure, states such as California have 
more progressive workplace regulations than could be realistically en-
acted by the federal government.  But numerous states have far more 
regressive rules.  Indeed, as bad as federal governance of the work-
place has been at times, many states have exhibited substantially more 
hostility to workplace rights.  Making matters worse, these regressive 
state rules often take the place of federal protections because pro-
employer lawmakers can use the crutch of states’ rights to resist fed-
eral reforms. 
One way to address this problem would be to use a ratchet ap-
proach, in which the federal rules act as a floor that states could ex-
ceed.  This approach would likely achieve the greatest level of work-
place rights, although employees’ ability to enforce those rights is 
questionable.  Further, it is possible that if the federal government 
had exclusive authority over the workplace, it would provide more 
protection than it does now, as the theoretical possibility of state regu-
lation would no longer exist.  However, even if eliminating state gov-
ernance would decrease the number of workplace rights, that de-
crease must still be weighed against the costs of a fragmented 
workplace regulatory system.  Any one state law has a low cost.  But 
aggregating those marginal effects greatly increases the impact. 
2008] WORKPLACE FEDERALISM 38 
 
III. 
A possible benefit of state control is the classic experimentation 
theory of federalism, which suggests that the “best” policies will perco-
late in the states and be adopted nationwide.  However, it is apparent 
that there is no such percolation with regard to workplace regulation, 
despite a long history of state governance.  Although some bills first 
appear in the states, they typically address old questions.  For exam-
ple, the Worker Freedom Act (WFA) bills that Professor Secunda ad-
vocates are technically new, but they go to the legality of captive audi-
ence speeches—a question that labor law has struggled with for 
decades.  Moreover, states generally pick from a menu of well-
established regulatory options, rather than act as testing ground for 
truly novel ideas.  The formulation of state workplace regulations 
looks like a typical struggle among political actors, not a laboratory 
experiment. 
The importance of politics in determining workplace rules has 
long been a constant, both at the federal and state level.  This reality is 
not only an impetus behind Professor Secunda’s proposal, but an im-
pediment to it as well.  As he notes, the current presidential admini-
stration has been no friend to workers.  Given the administration’s 
stance, why would it give states more power to undermine its policy 
goals?  Expanding state authority in an attempt to increase workers’ 
rights is likely to succeed only where it is least needed—in a federal 
government where lawmakers are already welcoming of such rights. 
Further, focusing workplace regulation in one system would give 
worker-side groups a better opportunity to sway the political debate, 
no matter which party is in power.  Currently, only employers have the 
resources to maintain a significant lobbying presence at every level of 
government that enacts workplace rules.  Employers will always have 
more resources, but focusing workplace regulations at the federal 
level would at least allow worker-side groups to be in the game. 
Finally, Professor Secunda’s reference to Chamber of Commerce v. 
Brown illustrates the danger of expanding state authority over the 
workplace.  If he is correct that Brown and the NLRA’s preemption 
doctrines do not foreclose state WFA statutes—and I am not sure that 
he is—then he is proposing to add significant complications to union 
organizing disputes.  Currently, the NLRA’s robust preemption means 
that the NLRB controls virtually all aspects of the organizing process.  
Thus, if the parties argue that the other side used improper tactics, 
such as retaliatory terminations or overly coercive captive audience 
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meetings, the NLRB adjudicates all of those allegations in a single 
proceeding.  To be sure, the NLRB adjudicatory process could be im-
proved, as it often takes longer than it should and lacks remedies suf-
ficient to deter much unlawful conduct; however, adding state laws to 
the mix is not the solution.  Indeed, Professor Secunda’s support for 
state WFA statutes runs counter to one view of the NLRB’s unwilling-
ness to proscribe captive audience meetings—that they are a normal 
and acceptable part of a union campaign.  Although I do not agree 
with that view, allowing states to fill in this “gap” may be ignoring that 
there really is no gap to be filled.  More significantly, state WFA stat-
utes would make the resolution of union election disputes more diffi-
cult. 
In contrast to the NLRB’s current control over union elections, 
imagine the same campaign dispute in a state that passed a WFA stat-
ute (Professor Secunda’s state of Wisconsin is a possible option, unlike 
my state of Tennessee which would be more likely to ban unions if it 
were given the authority to do so).  For instance, imagine that a union 
lost an election and alleges that the employer used unlawful termina-
tions or captive audience meetings to intimidate workers.  However, 
this time, the dispute is split between two forums.  The NLRB retains 
jurisdiction over the NLRA allegations, but now an entirely new claim 
exists.  The parties must litigate that claim in a state forum, but how 
would that litigation fit with the NLRB case?  The parties could easily 
be in a situation in which the state forum finds that the captive audi-
ence meetings violated the WFA statute, but the NLRB finds that the 
meetings did not violate the NLRA.  From the employees’ perspective, 
the WFA victory provides little solace because the NLRB would not 
overturn an election based on an action that violates state law but is 
permitted under the agency’s interpretation of the NLRA.  Therefore, 
unless the WFA statute has significant fines, what good is it other than 
to make election litigation more complicated? 
IV. 
Federalism is not a theory that requires adherence for its own 
sake.  Devolving authority to states is intended to provide benefits.  
Where those benefits are unable to offset the costs involved with state 
governance of an area, federalism should take a backseat to a different 
form of policymaking. 
Few areas illustrate the costs of federalism more than workplace 
law.  The complexity and confusion caused by multiple sources of law 
undermines the very purpose of those laws.  We should not, then, add 
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to the problem by giving states more authority, even if the current po-
litical situation makes that strategy tempting.  We should instead re-
member that political power is fleeting and devise a system of work-
place governance that is focused on the government best situated to 
regulate that area and most likely to create a system that accomplishes 
its goals.  The federal government’s regulation of the workplace has 
been far from perfect, but it is a far better choice than fifty different 
state regimes. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
More of Less:  The Limits of Minimalism and Self-Regulation 
Paul M. Secunda 
The battle lines have been sufficiently drawn in this Debate on the 
appropriateness of state regulation of the workplace.  I favor states 
playing a gap-filling role in workplace regulation where federal law is 
absent or silent and as part of their traditional role in legislating 
minimum condition laws to protect workers from inhumane working 
conditions.  Professor Hirsch, on the other hand, seeks the complete 
eradication of all state workplace regulation and advocates an exclu-
sive federal law regime.  His hope is that such a new system will actu-
ally make workers better off because they will more easily be able to 
enforce their remaining rights in a less complex regulatory world. 
The problem, however, is not one of complexity, but that federal 
agencies charged with carrying out the current law have neither the 
financial resources, the political will, nor the administrative tools to 
implement, enforce, and adjudicate these laws.  Eradicating state au-
thority over the workplace will not only fail to solve the present-day 
enforcement issues that Professor Hirsch and I agree are very real, but 
will also leave workers even more vulnerable to abuse as a result of 
fewer employment protections. 
I. 
Rather than reiterate points already made in the Opening State-
ments, I thought it would be useful to illustrate my concerns about in-
creased abuse of workers in an exclusive federal regime by taking Pro-
fessor Hirsch at his word and carrying out a thought experiment.  In 
this hypothetical world, only federal workplace laws exist.  Neverthe-
less, the federal government continues to prove unwilling and unable 
to protect the basic rights of workers through laws like the NLRA, ER-
ISA, and OSHA.  States have now, however, been field preempted out 
of the workplace regulation game. 
What approaches are left for governmental decision makers who 
still cannot adequately enforce these employment laws?  One possible 
approach is suggested by a number of legal scholars who have advo-
cated for a third way of workplace regulation:  new governance or self-
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regulation.  Its governance model is one of flexibility, adaptability, 
and non-coercive “soft” law.  Some of these types of schemes already 
exist in the real world and one such model has already been imple-
mented for over twenty-five years by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) in the form of the Voluntary Protec-
tion Programs (VPP). 
Through this real-world example, this Closing Statement seeks to 
define the limits of the minimalist approach that Professor Hirsch and 
the new governance theorists prefer under the rubric that “less is 
more.”  An examination of VPP, however, establishes the consequent 
need for state workplace regulation. 
II. 
In Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, Professor Orly Lo-
bel describes a “new governance” model having organizing principles 
“consisting of increased participation of nonstate actors, pub-
lic/private collaboration, diversity and competition, decentralization 
and subsidarity, integration of policy domains, flexibility and nonco-
erciveness (‘soft law’), adaptability and learning, and finally, legal or-
chestration.”  Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 498, 498 (2004).  Professor Lobel’s goal is to set up 
new governance theory as a “third way” that transcends the current di-
chotomy between command-and-control regulation and complete de-
regulation.  Although she applies her paradigm to different areas of 
law, for the purposes of this debate, I focus on the application of this 
governance model to the workplace. 
 First, to be fair, there does not seem to be a unified set of pre-
scriptions that the new governance model requires in the workplace 
and Lobel emphasizes that its application is context-sensitive to the 
legal problem being addressed.  Indeed, she identifies the constant 
call for renewal from within the model to be a key feature and stresses 
that flexibility and “soft law” should not be confused with a voluntary 
system. 
Nevertheless, I believe that the practical result of this increased 
call for decentralization, flexibility, and soft law approaches to the 
workplace will be the further aggrandizement of employer power at 
the expense of employees.  The administrative model that Lobel envi-
sions, and to which the Hirsch exclusively federal regime will likely 
lead, is one that relies on a flexible, opt-in employment regulation sys-
tem.  Employers are given some incentive to comply with the law and 
43 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 157: 28 
PENNumbra 
to implement internally best practices, but in these programs there 
appears to be lack of voluntary participation and program costs that 
exceed expected benefits.  Instead of leading to more effective self-
policing of the workplace by employers, this formalization of informal 
workplace practices suffers from self-selection bias and inefficient pri-
oritization of limited agency resources. 
III. 
Consider one of the practical examples that Professor Lobel sets 
forth in the employment context and keep in mind how it would op-
erate in the minimalist model of regulation that Professor Hirsch fa-
vors.  Lobel has argued for the expansion of governance-based ap-
proaches to worker safety and health while simultaneously expanding 
targeted enforcement in the context of federal OSHA regulation. 
Under the VPP, which has existed in one form or another at 
OSHA since 1982, labor, management, and the government work to-
gether to create a collaborative system for ensuring workplace safety 
and health.  More specifically, the program requires employers to 
meet certain performance-based criteria for a managed safety and 
health system.  For example, VPP participants must achieve illness and 
injury rates at or below the national average for their industries.  Per-
haps not surprisingly then, VPP work sites have more than fifty per-
cent below the average missed-days-from-work-rates than similar or-
ganizations in their industries. 
In return for participation in VPP, employers are supposed to 
benefit through fewer injuries and illnesses in the workplace and 
therefore, lower workers compensation premiums and fewer days 
missed by employees at work.  Perhaps more importantly and con-
cretely, from participating employers’ point of view, is that VPP mem-
bers are removed from OSHA’s programmed inspection list, which 
means their workplaces will only be inspected by OSHA if there is an 
accident or an employee files a complaint.  Moreover, OSHA does not 
issue citations for standard violations by VPP participating employers 
as long as they are corrected.  Once certified, most VPP employers are 
inspected every three to five years to see if they are still in compliance. 
This cooperative approach seeks to give incentive to employers to 
self-report by eliminating statutory penalties.  At the same time, the 
hope is that self-complying employers will take some of the strain off 
of OSHA in implementing and enforcing workplace safety and health 
law and allow the agency to focus on higher risk industries.  In short, 
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this program trusts employers to do the right thing from a safety and 
health perspective voluntarily. 
Nevertheless, the VPP program suffers from some significant 
problems.  Even Lobel recognizes the danger inherent in relying too 
much on employer cooperation and not enough on enforcement, es-
pecially when these cooperative programs develop in a primarily vol-
untary manner.  In such instances, these cooperative workplace pro-
grams can become window dressing on a safety and health workplace 
epidemic facing low-wage workers who engage in some of the most 
hazardous jobs. 
Three primary reasons explain the program’s dysfunction.  First, 
voluntary compliance programs are not cheap, and OSHA has been 
spending more of its ever-decreasing budgets on these programs in 
the last number of years as part of a larger deregulation movement by 
the Bush administration.  Second, companies that already care about 
safety and health issues self-select into the VPP program because they 
know their illness/injury rates are below the national average for their 
industry, so why not get the seal of approval from OSHA while avoid-
ing routine inspections and some citations?  Third, even with the tre-
mendous surge of participants in the VPP program over the last eight 
years, with numbers more than doubling, there still are only two thou-
sand participants out of the approximately seven million workplaces 
covered by OSHA. 
All of these issues together suggest that these same VPP compa-
nies would have met these standards anyway without the additional in-
centive and that the agency may be throwing money into a scheme 
that does not increase the overall rate of compliance with OSHA regu-
lations.  In fact, OSHA has fewer resources to ensure compliance with 
law by the vast majority of employers in this country, which means 
more workplaces are escaping even routine inspection by OSHA and 
more workers are subject to increased safety and health risks in the 
workplace. 
All told, the use of the VPP program by OSHA casts substantial 
doubt on the efficacy of new governance approaches.  After years of 
self-reflexive experimentation with the VPP process, there is no em-
pirical evidence that it has made workplace safety and health regula-
tions less complex or more easily enforceable (one of the benefits 
Professor Hirsch seeks with the elimination of state regulation).  In-
deed, to the extent that OSHA no longer provides a public forum to 
address the most common workplace safety and health issues for VPP 
employers, this governance approach also takes away from account-
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ability and transparency in the workplace at a time in our country’s 
history when such public goods are at a premium. 
IV. 
So what is the connection between Professor Hirsch’s minimalist 
approach and the new governance one of Professor Lobel?  Although 
Professor Hirsch does not discuss the merits of the new governance 
approach (and perhaps his Closing Statement will challenge my view 
that his regulatory regime will inevitably lead to dependence on new 
governance-based programs), his reliance on a minimalist scheme will 
likely require the use of governance approaches to make up for the 
lack of effective command-and-control enforcement at the federal 
level.  Indeed, as Professor Cynthia Estlund has elaborated upon, 
there has been a growing trend among employers to adopt this self-
regulation model in all areas of employment law.  See Cynthia Estlund, 
Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005).  I fear the federal-only regulated work-
place envisioned by Professor Hirsch will devolve into a system in 
which employers internalize regulatory enforcement and thereby ex-
acerbate the vulnerability of workers who increasingly lack a collective 
voice within these companies. 
At the end of the day, workers need more protection in the work-
place, not less.  Yet fewer laws, all at the federal level, insure less for-
malized protections and more dependence on employers acting out 
of altruistic motives and not just trying to get away with as much as 
possible.  I, for one, do not believe that adequate incentives currently 
exist in federal law for noncompliant employers to act substantially on 
their employees’ behalf.  When push comes to shove, and employees 
face employer intimidation when attempting to organize the work-
place or an employee files claims of sexual orientation discrimination 
not covered by federal law, I would prefer employees have the con-
crete ability to bring a claim under state or local law, even given the 
problem of accessibility to adjudicative forums that may arise. 
V. 
In The Big Squeeze, Steve Greenhouse recently described the lack of 
respect that American employees receive in the workplace.  STEVEN 
GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE:  TOUGH TIMES FOR THE AMERICAN 
WORKER 142-45, 207-09 (2008); Steven Greenhouse, Too Much  
Squeezing and Too Little Respect, TODAY’S WORKPLACE, http:// 
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www.todaysworkplace.org/2008/09/01/too-much-squeezing-and-too-
little-respect.  Examples included a Wal-Mart cashier who had manag-
ers that were so stingy about bathroom breaks that some cashiers 
ended up soiling themselves, a computer engineer who was laid off 
while his eight-year-old was visiting on Take Your Daughter to Work 
Day, and a software engineer who was suddenly fired along with seven-
teen other engineers and told that, if they wanted any severance pay, 
they had to train the workers from India replacing them.  Of course, 
there are a myriad of even more examples of employees at all levels 
suffering from similar and worse affronts. 
In this environment, workers should not be forced to exclusively 
depend on federal work laws that are out-dated for our globalized 
workplace (i.e., NLRA), under-utilized because of a lack of resources 
and questionable priorities (i.e., OSHA), or just plain cruel in their 
implementation because of the lack of remedial alternatives (i.e.,  
ERISA).  Nor should workers have to rely on vague promises that fed-
eral workplace regulation will someday get better.  Employees will not 
regain respect from their employers through such a self-regulatory 
scheme. They need all the help they can get in this employment-at-
will, right-to-work world.  And if the needed regulation is only avail-
able through the states, then so be it. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Paper Rights or Real Rights? 
Jeffrey M. Hirsch 
Paper rights or real rights?  That is the choice to be made between 
adding to the already large number of complex and ineffective work-
place rights or trying to find a different approach that gives employees 
what they have been promised.  Both Professor Secunda and I seek to 
enhance workplace protections for employees and—on paper—his 
argument for allowing states to enact gap-filling rights makes sense.  
But I fear that this additional authority would increase employers’ and 
the judiciary’s already significant hostility to workplace rights, and fur-
ther hinder employees’ ability to understand and enforce those rights. 
My primary assertion is that we need first a different means to en-
force current workplace goals, not a reshaping of the goals them-
selves.  I am sympathetic to Professor Secunda’s desire to expand 
workers’ substantive rights, but that argument puts the cart before the 
horse.  Simply adding more laws is unlikely to achieve the desired ef-
fect.  We should instead create a less complex system that actually en-
forces the rights that exist. 
Professor Secunda responds with a hypothetical federal regime 
that relies heavily on voluntary compliance.  Certainly this is a possibil-
ity that would likely undermine employees’ rights.  However, it is not 
one that I have advocated.  Indeed, I have strongly argued for a far 
different approach:  a regulatory regime that relies on private rights of 
action and provides more incentives for these claims than exist under 
many of today’s workplace laws. 
I. 
Professor Secunda warns that exclusive federal governance will 
“inevitably lead to dependence on new governance-based programs.”  
These programs move away from traditional command-and-control 
governance by embracing flexible and noncoercive attempts to 
achieve self-compliance.  As Professor Orly Lobel’s work in this area 
reveals, there are both benefits and costs to such governance.  Profes-
sor Secunda argues that a move away from command-and-control gov-
ernance would result in worse conditions for employees.  Although I 
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recognize the importance of some encouragement of employer self-
compliance through nonpunitive means, I agree with Professor 
Secunda that such measures should not replace more traditional 
workplace regulations.  That is why, in a current working paper, my 
proposal for exclusive federal regulation of the workplace uses an en-
forcement model that firmly relies upon private rights of action.  Pro-
fessor Secunda, in short, has attacked a straw man that I have not ad-
vocated and that is not an inevitable result of exclusive federal 
authority. 
In my arguments for reshaping workplace law at the federal level, 
I have promoted a simpler, more understandable system of enforce-
ment.  However, that simplification does not abandon litigation.  To 
the contrary, I have proposed a system that would primarily rely on 
private rights of action brought in federal court, possibly a new spe-
cialized labor and employment court.  Indeed, my belief that litigation 
is the best means of enforcement even leads me to reject a growing 
trend of encouraging private arbitration of workplace disputes.  The 
new “soft-law” type of enforcement measures that worries Professor 
Secunda could not be further from my intention. 
Moreover, noncoercive enforcement measures are not an inevita-
ble result of federal governance.  These alternatives are still novel and 
their use has not been widespread in either state or federal workplace 
regulations.  Even if something as radical as giving the federal gov-
ernment exclusive authority over the workplace occurred, there is no 
reason to think that the traditional governance approach would 
change.  Professor Secunda’s own examples prove the point.  He 
notes two federal statutes with strong federal preemption—the NLRA 
and ERISA.  Although both statutes have their share of problems, nei-
ther relies in any meaningful way upon noncoercive enforcement 
schemes.  Which federal statute does rely upon such measures?  It is 
OSHA, which happens to be a statute that allows for concurrent state 
regulation.  Although OSHA has a preemption clause, states may get 
permission to enforce federal safety and health regulations in the pri-
vate sector, and almost half of them have taken advantage of this op-
tion.  Thus, if voluntary compliance is the natural result of any en-
forcement scheme—and I do not believe that it is—current 
experience shows that it is more likely to result from joint federal-state 
control, not exclusive federal authority. 
Professor Cynthia Estlund’s work impliedly supports this idea.  As 
Professor Secunda notes, she has described employers’ growing use of 
self-regulation.  Yet, Professor Estlund also emphasizes that “[t]he 
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move toward self-regulation has not made major inroads on the basic 
federal labor standards statutes themselves.  Still, state and federal 
regulatory agencies have begun to experiment with forms of self-
regulation within the confines of these command-and-control stat-
utes.”  Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of 
Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 342-43 (2005) (footnotes 
omitted).  It appears that state governance presents as much, if not 
more, risk of noncoercive enforcement than federal governance. 
II. 
Although I disagree with his analysis, I appreciate Professor 
Secunda’s discussion of noncoercive enforcement measures, as it is 
exactly the type of conversation that I hoped my initial proposal would 
initiate.  My frustrations with the almost single-minded focus on sub-
stantive provisions—despite obvious failures with the system as a 
whole—is what led me to ask whether we might do better.  The sub-
stantive arguments are important.  However, they are severely circum-
scribed if they remain part of a broken enforcement scheme. 
In asking what we can do to improve enforcement of workplace 
laws, I have presumed a fixed level of workplace protection that is 
equivalent to the status quo.  That is not to say that I approve of the 
status quo; rather, I think we should address the enforcement prob-
lem before worrying about specific substantive issues.  There are rea-
sonable disagreements as to the best way to improve enforcement, but 
my belief is that exclusive federal control would better achieve our 
current workplace goals. 
Although eliminating state governance would directly simplify en-
forcement, exclusive federal authority would also allow for other im-
provements to the enforcement regime.  Thus, my proposal identifies 
several areas in which the patchwork of workplace rights and stan-
dards can be simplified, even within a single system.  For instance, I 
recommend placing all workplace laws under a single statute.  Impor-
tantly, this scheme would, as much as possible, establish a unitary set 
of rules for all workplace claims.  No longer would a worker have to 
worry about differences in each law’s statutes of limitations, burdens 
of proof, definitions, and a host of other provisions. 
Moreover, fewer laws could actually produce greater protections.  
For example, as I have explained elsewhere, one could replace all cur-
rent laws affecting terminations with a unitary business-justification 
requirement.  The change would dramatically reduce the number of 
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provisions regulating the end of the employment relationship.  Yet, in 
doing so, it could actually strengthen the policies of those provisions 
by establishing a single, relatively uncomplicated rule for termina-
tions.  Such a rule would make it easier to recognize and challenge 
terminations that were based on discrimination or other illicit rea-
sons, while also reducing the hostility that often stands in the way of 
such claims. 
I would also place authority to administer this statute with a single 
agency.  Eliminating the current alphabet soup of agencies with au-
thority over the workplace would help make workplace rights more 
consistent and avoid the problems that can occur when an agency 
with a very narrow specialty deals with a case touching on broader is-
sues.  Take, for example, the NLRB’s latest attempt to determine 
whether non-unionized employees enjoy the same right under the 
NLRA to have a co-worker present during an investigatory interview 
that unionized employees’ possess.  In reversing its previous position 
that non-unionized employees have that right, the NLRB relied on 
employers’ need to conduct investigations of sexual harassment.  If 
the NLRB had any significant experience with such claims, it may have 
recognized that no serious conflict existed between an employer in-
vestigating claims of harassment and an employee electing to have a 
co-worker present for an interview.  A single agency with authority 
over all workplace claims would be in a much better position to han-
dle the large number of workplace disputes that implicate a variety of 
policy concerns. 
Finally, and most important to Professor Secunda’s argument, I 
advocate a litigation-based enforcement approach.  Although I would 
accept the use of today’s judicial system for resolving the new work-
place claims, I recommend the creation of a specialized, Article III la-
bor and employment court.  Such a court provides the benefits of an 
Article III tribunal while avoiding today’s unfortunate reality, in which 
many judges exhibit not only an ignorance of the underlying policies 
of workplace laws, but an outright hostility to such claims.  The num-
ber of claims and their complexity are a large part of this problem; 
thus, by simplifying these claims and removing them to a specialized 
court, the judicial impediments to the enforcement of workplace 
rights will be dramatically lessened.  However, this change, as well as 
those accompanying the unitary law and agency, would not be possi-
ble under a system where state and local governments continue to 
possess significant authority over the workplace. 
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III. 
The question of whether and how to increase the number of 
workplace rights is important.  Yet it is a secondary concern.  Increas-
ing workplace protections via a broken system creates false hope and 
ultimately leaves workers with few if any gains.  Instead, we should 
strive to fix the broken enforcement framework and then worry about 
expanding rights.  To do otherwise only serves to remind us of what 
we could have achieved if we had resisted yet another shortsighted 
change and instead sought to harmonize our regulation of the work-
place. 
Ultimately, both Professor Secunda and I believe that the federal 
government currently fails to provide enough protections for workers.  
He believes that this performance is unlikely to improve and, even if it 
does, giving states increased authority would help address whatever 
shortcomings exist.  The costs associated with a further fragmentation 
of workplace law makes me disagree.  I acknowledge that, on paper, 
Professor Secunda is correct and that there is a danger that a pro-
employer federal government could use its exclusive authority to drop 
the level of protections below a critical threshold.  However, the pos-
sible gains of a more streamlined and effective workplace regulatory 
system seem worth that risk. 
Moreover, I do not think the potential trade-off is particularly 
large, as I am extremely doubtful that increased state regulations 
would help much.  Only a small handful of states have actively in-
creased workplace protections.  In contrast, most states either do little 
more than mirror the federal status quo or aggressively favor em-
ployer interests over those of workers.  In short, even if Professor 
Secunda is correct that federal agencies “carrying out the current law 
have neither the financial resources, the political will, nor the admin-
istrative tools to implement, enforce, and adjudicate these laws,” it is 
important to remember that state legislatures and agencies have even 
fewer of these characteristics. 
The crux of Professor Secunda’s argument is that the imperfect 
solution of fragmented state gap filling is better than nothing.  For 
some workers, at least in the short term, he is no doubt correct.  But 
that strategy may be short-lived.  It would continue to apply small 
bandages over significant problems—bandages that give federal poli-
cymakers an excuse not to seek a real solution.  It would also repre-
sent yet another example of incremental policymaking that has pro-
duced the current patchwork of workplace laws that Professor 
Secunda agrees is broken. 
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Why not, instead, look holistically at workplace laws and try to de-
vise a system that works better?  My sense is that exclusive federal gov-
ernance is the best strategy.  But even if one disagrees with my specific 
proposal, that does not mean that a different solution is not available.  
What seems clear, however, is that simply tinkering with our current 
system is the one strategy that is doomed to failure.  Even if we expand 
the number of workplace rights on paper, past experience has shown 
repeatedly that such an expansion often does not lead to significantly 
better conditions for workers.  We should therefore aim for a system 
that does what is says, rather than continually providing false hope.  In 
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